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STATE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES
AFTER THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 AND DOUGLAS v. SEA-
COAST PRODUCTS, INC.
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM *
PATRICIA E. MCDONALD **
Two recent events portend significant changes in the management
of marine fisheries by the United States: the passage of the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)l and the
Supreme Court's decision in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.2 Con-
gress passed the FCMA to conserve and regulate fishery resources
found off the coasts of the United States. The Act established a 197
mile exclusive fisheries conservation zone 3 contiguous to the three-
mile territorial sea. It also created eight Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Councils responsible for preparing and implementing fishery
management plans for all fisheries within their jurisdictions.4 The
FCMA, which has been noted and discussed, 5 is an attempt by Con-
gress to benefit the domestic fishing industry. The Act advances this
goal by establishing a framework within which the federal govern-
ment may secure control over foreign fishing vessels in American
waters, promote the conservation of fishery resources, and induce the
replenishment of fishery stocks that have been depleted by over-
exploitation., The effect of the FCMA upon state regulation of marine
* B.A., St. Joseph's College (Indiana); J.D., University of Michigan; Fulbright
Diploma, University of Louvain (Belgium). Professor of Law, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
** A.B., University of Illinois. Second year student, University of North Caro-
lina School of Law.
1. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. 1977).
2. 97 S. Ct. 1740 (1977).
3. FCMA, § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (Supp. 1977). The United States assumes
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish within the conservation zone
except for highly migratory species. Also under the United States' control are
anadromous species throughout their range and all fishery resources of the con-
tinental shelf. Id. § 102, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812.
4. Id. §§ 302(a), (h), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852 (a), (h).
5. See, e.g., Comment, The Effects of the 200-Mile United States Fishing
Zone, 37 LA. L. REv. 852 (1977); Comment, The Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976: Structure and Function of A Contiguous Economic
Zone, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 331 (1977).
6. FCMA, § 2, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (Supp. 1977). See S. REP. NO. 416, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
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fisheries, however, was largely overlooked by Congress. Until now,
the states have enjoyed relative autonomy in developing their own
management plans.
As the FCMA will alter state management of marine fisheries,
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.7 similarly will restrict state marine
fishery laws in other respects. The Supreme Court held in Douglas
that two Virginia statutes discriminating against nonresident and
alien fishermen were preempted by federal statutes governing the en-
rollment and licensing of foreign vessels.8 Thus a state may not deny
federally licensed ships the right to fish unless the denial is based
upon reasonable conservation and environmental measures applied
equally to all fishermen.9
This Article will explore the effect of these two developments on
state management of marine fisheries. First, traditional limitations on
state regulation, including Douglas, are examined to provide a legal
background against which the FCMA will operate. Second, the
FCMA is discussed in detail to demonstrate its comprehensive nature.
Finally, the Article considers specific impacts and changes likely to
occur in the management of marine fisheries by a typical coastal
state, North Carolina.
I. THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE
CONTROL OF MARINE FISHERIES
A. State Jurisdiction Over Fisheries Within Territorial Waters
In analyzing the law of fisheries management one initially must
determine the sources and extent of state jurisdiction and control
over marine fisheries. States historically have asserted claims of con-
trol over fisheries located both within and without territorial waters.
Prior to 1900, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the
states, as sovereign representatives of the people, possessed an owner-
ship interest in fish and wildlife located within their territories.10
7. 97 S. Ct. 1740 (1977).
8. Id. at 1753.
9. Id. at 1751, 1753.
10. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1896) (the state, as
the sovereign representative of its people, has the right to control and regulate,
to the maximum extent possible, the common ownership of wildlife); Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 259-60 (1891) (states have an ownership interest
in territorial waters and the fish within those waters) ; McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391, 394-95 (1877) (states exercise control over their tidal waters and the
fish within those waters); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842)
(the common ownership interest of New Jersey in marine fisheries within navi-
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Subsequently, in Missouri v. Holland 1 the Court limited the state
ownership doctrine to include only wildlife reduced to actual posses-
sion by skillful capture, 12 noting that the claim to title in migratory
creatures rested upon a "slender reed." 13
In 1948 the Supreme Court discarded the concept of "ownership"
and described the doctrine as a "fiction," which was utilized to ex-
press the states' power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
their natural resources. 14 This power to regulate fishes in territorial
waters, the Court stated, was always subject to paramount powers re-
tained by the federal government.'5 The theory of state ownership re-
surfaced in 1953, however, with the passage of the Submerged Lands
Act,16 which vested in the states "title to and ownership of... natural
resources" within their navigable waters and the lands beneath them.17
Included in this statutory grant was the "right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop, and use" the natural resources,' which
were defined to include fish, shrimp, oysters, and other marine animal
and plant life.' 9 Subject to the paramount powers of the federal gov-
ernment, the Submerged Lands Act confirmed the ownership interest
of the states in the marine resources found within their territorial
waters .
20
Despite this statutory grant the Supreme Court in Douglas denied
that the states acquired a true ownership interest; rather, they
possessed merely a power of administration and control over marine
resources within their territorial jurisdiction.2' Whether the state's
gable waters was paramount to a right of private ownership traceable to a grant
by royal charter to the Duke of York).
11. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
12. Justice Holmes stated: "Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone and
possession is the beginning of ownership." Id. at 434. See also Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (1977).
13. 252 U.S. at 434.
14. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
15. Id.
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
17. Id. § 3 (a), 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
18. Id. The Act reserved to the federal government all powers it previously held
for "the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs." Id. § 6 (a), 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (a). See United States v. Rands,
389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967).
19. Submerged Lands Act, § 2(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
20. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 187 (1975) ; Maine v. Tamano,
357 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (D. Me. 1973); Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771, 773
(D. Md.), affd, 335 U.S. 37 (1957). See also Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 97
S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
21. 97 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (1977). Justices Rehnquist and Powell, although con-
curring in the judgment, dissented from that part of the Court's opinion interpret-
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interest is described as one of ownership or the power to regulate and
control, however, Douglas confirmed the right of states to apply
"reasonable, non-discriminatory conservation and environmental pro-
tection measures" 22 to coastal fishing within their territory, which
generally includes the offshore waters three nautical miles from the
"coastline." 23
B. Extraterritorial State Jurisdiction
In addition to the ownership theory empowering states to manage
fisheries within their territorial waters, two legal doctrines establish-
ing the authority of coastal states to regulate and manage marine
fisheries located beyond their territorial waters have been recognized.
The first doctrine arose from state regulations collectively known as
"landing laws." 24 Under such regulations, states may exercise control
over fish caught beyond the three mile limit that subsequently are
brought within their territorial waters. In the principal case of Bay-
ing the Submerged Lands Act. They agreed that the states do not own marine
resources within their territorial limits in the traditional property right sense,
but the two Justices asserted that the states have a "substantial proprietary in-
terest" or "common ownership" right in fish and game within their boundaries. Id.
at 1753. This state right, in their view, predated the Submerged Lands Act, which
did not alter the "pre-existing powers of the States over fish" because the primary
grant of the Act did not extend to any interest over free-swimming fish. Id. at
1754. The dissent thus emphasized that the common law, rather than a federal
grant of authority under the Submerged Lands Act, was the true source of
state control over fishing resources. Because this interest existed independently of
federal authorization, the states possessed broad powers over fishery resources
which could be overridden only when those rights were exercised in clear violation
of a constitutional provision or in direct conflict with federal law. Id. at 1754.
The Supreme Court Justices therefore disagreed over the precise origin of the
doctrine of state control, and the ownership theory may surface in some form in
the future.
22. Id. at 1748.
23. The "coastline" under the Submerged Lands Act is identical to the "base-
line" under international law. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165
(1965). Territorial jurisdiction extends three geographic miles for all coastal
states, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 526 (1975), except Texas and
Florida, which enjoy a jurisdiction extending three marine leagues (9 nautical
miles) into the Gulf of Mexico. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
See Submerged Lands Act, § 2(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970).
24. Generally, landing laws prohibit the possession, sale, or transportation of
fish or game within a state if such possession, sale, or transportation violates
state law. The prohibition extends to all fish because it is impossible to distinguish
between fish caught within or without state territorial waters, and any limitation




side Fish Co. 'v. Gentry 25 the Supreme Court upheld as a valid exercise
of the state's police power a California landing law, regulating the
processing of sardines, -that applied equally to all of those fish regard-
less of where they were caught.26 The purpose of the regulation was
to prevent a depletion of the local fish supply, and jurisdiction to
control the sardines brought into the state was necessary to prevent
evasion of this local policy.27 Because any impact on commerce was
incidental and beyond the purposes of the legislation, the Court re-
jected the argument that the landing law placed an improper .burden
on interstate commerce.28 Consequently, justified by conservation en-
forcement considerations, the states could prohibit possession of fish
taken outside their territorial waters 29 and require a permit for any
fishing vessel operating within state waters even though its catch
may have come from operations conducted wholly outside the state.30
The second basis for extraterritorial regulation of marine fisheries
is derived from the right of a state to control the conduct of its citizens
on the high seas. The Supreme Court relied on this rationale in
Skiriotes v. Florida 3 1 to affirm the conviction of a Florida resident
who had used gear prohibited under Florida law to harvest sponges
outside the territorial limit of the state.32 The Court upheld the regula-
tion as a valid exercise of the state's police power over one of its citi-
25. 297 U.S. 422 (1936).
26. Id. at 426.
27. Id. The purpose of the statute was to conserve as a food source fish found
within state waters. Because sardines are a migratory fish and because those
taken from waters within the state's jurisdiction are indistinguishable from those
taken without, the state was justified in effectuating its policy by applying the
statute to sardines brought within its boundaries. Id.
28. Id.
29. E.g., State v. Richardson, 285 A.2d 842, 846 (Me. 1972) (statute prohibiting
the possession of lobster, regardless of the source of possession, on a boat rigged
for otter or beam trawling bears a rational relationship to the proper maintenance
of the lobster fishery in Maine's coastal waters).
30. E.g., Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash. 2d 281, -, 280 P.2d 1038, 1042-43
(1955) (statute that requires persons to obtain a permit for operating commercial
fishing vessels used for catching salmon in off-shore waters and transporting them
in and through state waters for delivery within the state is valid as an exercise of
the state's power to regulate its salmon industry for conservation purposes);
Santa Cruz Oil Corp. v. Milnor, 55 Cal. App. 2d 56, -, 130 P.2d 256, 260 (1942)
(statute requiring a permit for fishing vessels operating within state waters,
although delivering their catch outside the state and regardless of where the
fishing occurs, is valid as an exercise of the police power to "protect and conserve
the state's fisheries from possible depletion and waste by virtue of uncontrolled
taking of fish from the waters of the state to points beyond its jurisdiction").
31. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
32. Id. at 79.
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zens, which was permissible in the absence of any conflict with federal
law.33
Recently, a series of cases arising in Alaska explored a new basis
for state extraterritorial jurisdiction over marine fisheries.34 The con-
troversies involved regulations to control crab fishing in the Bering
Sea Shellfish Area, which extends hundreds of miles west of Alaska's
shoreline.3 5 The regulations provided for the closing of the crab fish-
ing area each year after 23,000,000 pounds of crab had been taken 36
and made it unlawful to possess, transport, buy, or sell additional
crabs "taken in any waters seaward of that officially designated as the
territorial waters of Alaska." 37 In Hjelle v. Brooks 38 crab fishermen
from the state of Washington obtained a preliminary injunction in the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska against the en-
forcement of these regulations on the ground that they unconstitu-
tionally burdened interstate commerce.3 9 Because the state purported
to exercise direct control over crabs in the entire Bering Sea Shellfish
33. Id. at 75. The Court held that criminal statutes "dealing with acts that are
directly injurious to the government, and capable of perpetration without regard
to particular locality" are applicable to United States citizens even if they are on
the high seas or within a foreign country. Id. at 73-74. Furthermore, with respect
to matters in which the state has a legitimate interest and no conflict exists with
federal laws, the state possesses a sovereign authority over the conduct of its
citizens upon the high seas analogous to the authority of the United States in
like circumstances. Id. at 77. For other cases applying the Skiriotes rationale, see
Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1967)
(Florida has sufficient interest in crawfish, which move freely in and out of its
territorial waters, to justify subjecting its citizens to conservation regulations
concerning the taking of crawfish outside its territorial waters) ; People v. Fore-
tich, 14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 14, 92 Cal. Rptr. 481, 487 (Super. Ct. 1970)
(dictum) (although defendants were illegally taking fish within the state's ter-
ritorial waters, the court noted that the state also would have the authority to
prosecute the defendants if their illegal acts had been committed beyond the
three-mile limit).
34. For a history of the regulations and resulting controversies see State v.
Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 533-34 (Alas.), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. Uri v.
Alaska, 97 S. Ct. 40 (1976).
35. ALAs. COMMERCIAL FISHING REG. § 5 AAC 07.100 (1973).
36. Id. at § 5 AAC 07.760.
37. Id. at § 5 AAC 36.040.
38. 377 F. Supp. 430 (D. Alas. 1974), vacated, 424 F. Supp. 595 (D. Alas.
1976). The decision in the second Hjelle case came after the federal plaintiffs
voluntarily requested a stay of proceedings to allow the disposition of state
criminal proceedings and a decision by the Alaska Supreme Court on the federal
claims challenging the regulations' constitutionality. The consequence of this
abstention by stipulation was to prevent relitigation of the plaintiffs' claims on
the merits.
39. 377 F. Supp. at 437-38.
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Area, the court rejected Alaska's -contention that the regulations were
necessary to conserve crab fishing within the state.40 Although the
landing law cases permit a state to regulate extraterritorial conduct
to facilitate conservation of a resource clearly within the state, the
court distinguished Hjelle from those cases on its facts.41 Because of
the direct extraterritorial effect of the regulations and the absence of a
showing that their purpose was to facilitate conservation enforcement
within state waters, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely
to prevail on the merits and issued the preliminary injunction.4 2
Following the Hjelle decision the Alaska Board of Fish and Game
repealed the objectionable regulations and issued emergency mea-
sures. 43 These provisions established a series of crab fishing closures
for designated "statistical areas," each of which consisted of a "regis-
tration" area of waters within state jurisdiction and an adjacent sea-
ward "biological influence zone." 4 In State v. Bundrant 45 the Alaska
Supreme Court reiviewed -the convictions of several crab fishermen
charged with violating these new regulations. The defendants were of
two categories: 46 those charged with illegal possession within the
three mile limit of crabs taken on the high seas and those charged with
prohibited extraterritorial activities within closed areas located six-
teen to sixty miles off the Alaskan coast. Only one of the defendants
was an Alaskan resident.47
In holding that both categories of defendants were properly charged
and subject to state regulation,48 the Alaska Supreme Court repudi-
ated the analysis of Hjelle 49 and departed from the well-established
limits on state power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
court refused to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the landing law
cases, which would have required the demonstration of an enforce-
ment problem within state territorial waters as a prerequisite for
expanded state jurisdiction; 5 instead, the court stated that the
40. Id. at 441.
41. Id. at 440-41.
42. Id. at 441.
43. See note 34 supra.
44. ALAs. COMMERCIAL FISHING REG. § 5 AAC 34.005.
45. 546 P.2d 530 (Alas.), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 97
S. Ct. 40 (1976).
46. Id. at 535-36.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 556.
49. See id. at 552-53.
50. Id. at 553. The court concluded that the decisions in the landing law cases
were justified primarily on the basis of resource conservation and that, although
an enforcement problem existed in most of the cases, the decisions did not require
that such a problem be present. Id.
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test was whether the regulations bore a "reasonable relationship to the
purpose sought to be achieved." 51 Thus the issue was whether extra-
territorial control was necessary on ecological grounds for the con-
servation of fishery resources that existed partially within state
waters. Applying this doctrine, the court concluded that because crabs
are migratory creatures, moving beyond the state's territorial bound-
aries at various times during the year, Alaska's regulation of activity
on the high seas was necessary to conserve the crabs existing within
its waters and thus clearly within the state's police power.5 2
The court in Bundrant also extended the Skiriotes concept of the
power of a state to regulate the conduct of its citizens on the high
seas. Citing precedents from domestic and international law,53 the
court broadened this principle into a general concept of "objective
territorial" jurisdiction whereby a state may control the activities
of noncitizens outside its jurisdiction when those activities have detri-
mental effects on a fishery within state waters.-4 The impact of this
concept is to allow direct state enforcement against noncitizens on the
high seas.55
Although Bundrant held that a unilateral assertion by Alaska over
fishery resources located beyond its territorial waters was not pre-
empted by any paramount federal law,56 this result can no longer ob-
tain because the FCMA declares the exclusive fishery management au-
thority of the United States within the 197 mile fishery conservation
51. Id.
52. Id. at 554. The Alaska Supreme Court also has applied this doctrine to
uphold extraterritorial regulation of the state's scallop fishery. State v. Sieminski,
556 P.2d 929, 933-34 (Alas. 1976).
53. 546 P.2d at 555 n.105.
54. Id. at 555. The concept of objective territorial jurisdiction is based on the
"general proposition that acts done outside a jurisdiction which produce detri-
mental effects inside it justify a state in punishing [the one] who caused the
harm as if he had been present at the place of [harm] ." Id.
55. Id. at 555-56. The court reasoned that the restriction of a state's ability to
enforce its fishery regulations, especially those governing migratory species of
fish, with respect to nonresidents would lead to a deliberate frustration of the
state's legitimate conservation objectives and strip the state of an effective means
of regulation. Id. at 555. Therefore, by broadening the concept of "citizen" to in-
clude all American nationals, the state could enforce its regulations against
citizens of other states on the high seas when necessary to protect its own fishery
resources. Id. at 555-56.
56. Id. at 545-46. The court interpreted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1334 (1964 & Supp. 1977), as limited in scope to inorganic
resources such as minerals and oil in the outer shelf's subsoil and seabed. The
court thus determined that the Act did not affect the organic marine life resources
found in the outer shelf. Id. at 546-47. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, §
3, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
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zone 5, and further prohibits a state from directly or indirectly regu-
lating fishing outside its boundaries with the exception of state-
registered vessels.58 Moreover, the court's analysis in Bundrant is
highly questionable. By recognizing the "nationality" principle of
international law,59 Skiriotes allows states to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over their citizens. Bundrant, however, transforms this
principle into "objective territorial" jurisdiction, which focuses on the
effect within the state of activities outside its territory 60 The applica-
tion of this rule is dubious: the court did not discuss whether the
harmful effect within the state was both direct and substantial, as is
required by section 18 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations, upon
which the court relied as authority.61
A more difficult question is whether Congress intended through the
FCMA to preempt even the well-established bases of state extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. The Act provides a saving clause for state jurisdic-
tion but restricts its exercise to within state boundaries and prohibits
direct or indirect regulation beyond such areas. 62 By its literal terms,
therefore, the Act appears to prohibit state extraterritorial regulation
based on either landing law or state citizen jurisdiction, except with
respect to state-registered vessels. The legislative history of the FCMA
is curiously silent on this issue, although a debate between Senators
Stevens and Gravel suggests a legislative intent to restrict the exercise
of state control.63 Regardless, implementation of the FCMA will make
state extraterritorial control less significant because the Act con-
templates the formation of unified management plans promulgated
by the states and Regional Councils for those species of fish that are
57. FOMA, §§ 101-102, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-1812 (Supp. 1977).
58. Id. § 306(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a).
59. See 313 U.S. at 77.
60. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
61. 546 P.2d at 555 n.105; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 18 (1965).
62. FCMA, § 306(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a) (Supp. 1977). This section pro-
vides that nothing in the Act "shall be construed as extending or diminishing the
jurisdiction or authority of any State within its boundaries." Id. In addition, §
1856 (b) provides that if a state takes any action substantially or adversely affect-
ing the implementation of a fishery management plan the Secretary of Commerce
may assume responsibility for the regulation of any fishery until the state proves
to the Secretary's satisfaction that the need for federal regulation no longer
prevails. Id. § 306 (b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856 (b).
63. 122 CONG. REC. S116-20 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Gravel
and Sen. Stevens). One commentator has suggested that Senator Magnuson, the
bill's sponsor, deliberately established federal preemption over extraterritorial
fisheries to advance the interests of Washington's king crab fishermen in the
waters off Alaska. C. Curtis, Alaska's Regulation of King Crab on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 6 U.C.L.A. -ALAs. L. REv. 375, 406-08 (1977).
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found both within and without the three mile limit and the coordina-
tion of fishery regulations at the Council level.6 4 Landing laws will be
unnecessary as enforcement devices because federal authorities will
enforce fishery regulations, using the facilities and personnel of the
states on an as-needed basis.6 5 Similarly, the implementation of a na-
tional fishery management program obviates the need for state citizen
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
C. Limits on State Jurisdiction
Even within the three mile limit, the Constitution and applicable
federal law restrict state control over marine fisheries. In Toomer v.
Witselt " the Supreme Court held that a South Carolina statute re-
quiring nonresidents to pay a $2,500 license fee and residents only $25
was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Con-
stitution. 67 Interpreting the clause as a guarantee of the right of
nonresidents to engage in commercial fishing within a state on an
equal basis with citizens of that state, the Court stated that a dis-
parity in the treatment of nonresidents is justifiable only when a
substantial reason exists for the discrimination beyond the mere fact
that the nonresidents are citizens of another state; furthermore, if
such reason exists, the degree of discrimination must bear a close
relation to the state's purpose.68 The Court rejected as unsubstantiated
by the record arguments that the discriminatory fees were necessary
to maintain conservation and to recover costs of enforcement. 9
Toomer also overturned a South Carolina statute that required all
owners of shrimp boats fishing within the state's territorial waters
to unload their catch at a South Carolina port.70 Because the statute's
purpose was to divert business to South Carolina that otherwise would
have gone to other states, it created a burden on interstate commerce,
64. See NOAA Guidance for Regional Fishery Management Councils, 42 Fed.
Reg. 34,449, 34,459 (1977) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 602.2(d) (2)) [herein-
after cited as NOAA Guidance].
65. FCMA, § 311 (a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (Supp. 1977).
66. 334 U.S. 385 (1947).
67. Id. at 395.
68. Id. at 396-97. The Court also rejected the state ownership theory as a justi-
fication for discrimination against nonresidents, id. at 402, and distinguished
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), which upheld a Virginia statute pro-
hibiting nonresidents from planting oysters in the tidal waters of the Ware
River. The Court restricted McCready to inland waters and non-free swimming
fish. 334 U.S. at 401.
69. 334 U.S. at 397-99.
70. Id. at 406.
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which contravened the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution.7'1
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment also has
been used as the basis for declaring state fisheries regulation un-
constitutional. In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission 72 the
Supreme Court held that a California statute barring the issuance
of commercial fishing licenses to "persons ineligible for citizenship"
was directed towards resident Japanese aliens and therefore created
an impermissible classification. 73 The concept of equal protection
guarantees resident aliens the same right to earn a livelihood as is en-
joyed by all citizens 7 4
In the recent Douglas decision, the Supreme Court announced an-
other limitation on state regulation of marine fisheries. The Court
relied on a preemption rather than a constitutional ground to invali-
date two Virginia statutes 75 restricting the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to United States citizens and prohibiting nonresidents
from catching menhaden in the Virginia portion of Chesapeake Bay."
The Virginia laws were challenged by Seacoast Products, Inc., which
was a Delaware corporation qualified to do business in Virginia and
a subsidiary of a British corporation owned primarily by alien stock-
holders. Seacoast Products' fishing vessels were enrolled and licensed
as United States flag ships under the federal enrollment and licensing
laws.77
71. Id. at 404-06. Although a statute that levied a tax on shrimp was upheld
as a local measure and therefore not burdensome on interstate commerce, the
Court rejected the argument that the landing statute was valid because it facili-
tated collection of the tax. Id. at 394-95.
72. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
73. Id. at 420. The Court declared that state laws imposing discriminatory
burdens on the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully admitted into the United
States conflict with the federal government's exclusive power to regulate immi-
gration. Id. at 418-19. The practical effect of denying an alien the equal op-
portunity to earn a livelihood was tantamount to denying him entrance and resi-
dence. Id. at 416. The Court also rejected the state's contention that its statute
was necessary to protect its "special public interest" in conserving its fishing
resources for its own citizens. Id. at 420-21.
74. Id. at 419-20.
75. The statutes prohibited nonresidents of Virginia from catching menhaden in
Virginia's portion of the Chesapeake Bay, VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-60 (Supp. 1976),
and prevented noncitizens, regardless of residence, from obtaining commercial
fishing licenses for any fish taken in Virginia waters. Id. § 28.1-81.1 (Supp. 1976).
76. 97 S. Ct. at 1745.
77. The enrollment and licensing laws are codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 11-351
(1970). The purpose of enrollment is to indicate the national character of a vessel
and to enable it to secure a license, which regulates the ship's use and prevents
the commission of fraud on the revenue laws of the United States. Ships that
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Relying on Gibbons v. Ogden,78 the Supreme Court held that the
enrollment and licensing of a vessel under federal law created an
implicit authority to perform the activity for which the ship was
licensed.7 9 Because Seacoast Products' vessels had been licensed for
fishing, they had been granted the "right to fish in Virginia waters
on the same terms as Virginia residents." 80 The discriminatory Vir-
ginia laws were in direct conflict with federal law and thus in-
valid under the supremacy clause of the Constitution."' A state there-
fore could subject enrolled or licensed fishing vessels only to reason-
able conservation and environmental restrictions that were equally
applicable to state residents.8 2
The decision in Douglas may be criticized because it does not invali-
date discrimination against all nonresidents, but only against those
with federally documented vessels. Certain categories of ships, most
importantly those of less than five net tons, are exempt from the
enrollment and licensing laws.8 3 Thus, at least under the Douglas
theory, states still could ban nonresident owners of smaller vessels
from fishing within their waters.
II. THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
The purpose of the FCMA is to establish the comprehensive manage-
ment and conservation of fishery resources found off the coasts of the
United States. 4 This broad aim is implemented through the declara-
tion of a federal fishery conservation zone contiguous to and extend-
are properly enrolled and licensed are recognized as vessels of the United States
and thus are entitled to the privileges of domestic vessels employed in the coastal
trade or fisheries. 97 S. Ct. at 1745-46. The enrollment and licensing laws usually
require that the vessels be owned by citizens, but an exception permits a corpora-
tion having alien stockholders to register or enroll ships if it is organized under
domestic law, its president and chairman of the board are American citizens, and
no more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute
a quorum are noncitizens. Id. at 1746; see 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1970); 46 C.F.R.
§ 67.03-5 (a) (1976).
78. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
79. 97 S. Ct. at 1749.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1753.
82. Id. at 1748. In a companion case to Douglas, the Supreme Court intimated
that the Douglas rationale could be used to invalidate a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting nonresidents from dragging for fish by beam or otter trawl in Vine-
yard Sound during July, August, and September. The Court therefore remanded
the case for determination of the issue of federal preemption. Massachusetts v.
Westcott, 97 S. Ct. 1755 (1977).
83. 46 C.F.R. § 67.01-11 (1976).
84. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
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ing 197 nautical miles from the geographical limit of state territorial
waters.8 5 All fishery resources found within this zone, with the ex-
ception of the highly migratory species of tuna," are subject to the
exclusive management of the United States; moreover, this manage-
ment authority extends beyond the zone when necessary to control the
continental shelf and anadromous fishery resources.8 7
Under the Act Congress created eight Regional Fishery Manage-
ment Councils to control the fishery conservation zone.88 A state's
voting representative on its respective Council is the principal marine
fishery management official from that state. Other Council members
entitled to vote are the regional directors of the National Marine
Fisheries Service and a designated number of persons appointed by
the Secretary of Commerce from a group of qualified individuals
selected by the governors of each region's constituent states.8 9 Each
Council's primary duty is to promulgate a fishery management plan
for every management unit in its respective fishery.90 The plans are
subject to review by the Secretary of Commerce for approval, disap-
proval, or partial disapproval. 91 If any Council fails either to prepare
or to modify a plan in an appropriate fashion, then the Secretary may
prepare a suitable plan.92
Each plan must meet seven national standards that axe set forth in
the FCMA. The most important of these requires that conservation
and management measures prevent overfishing while achieving the
optimal yield from each fishery on a continuing basis 3 The procedure
for finding the optimal yield (OY) begins with the biological deter-
mination of the maximum sustainable yield (MSY),94 which is the
largest average annual catch or yield in terms of weight of fish caught
that can be taken continuously from a fishery stock.95 To fix the OY,
the MSY is reduced by appropriate amounts, which are attributable
85. FCMA, § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (Supp. 1977).
86. Id. §§ 3(14), 103, §§ 1802(14), 1813.
87. Id. §§ 102-103, §§ 1812-1813. See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
88. FCMA, § 302, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852 (Supp. 1977). The several Regional
Councils include: the New England Council, the Mid-Atlantic Council, the South
Atlantic Council, the Caribbean Council, the Gulf Council, the Pacific Council,
the North Pacific Council, and the Western Pacific Council. Id.
89. Id. § 302(b) (1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(b) (1).
90. A management unit is defined as "[a]ny species, stock or group of species
or stocks of fish that is geographically or ecologically interrelated or is affected
as a group by fishing practices, that is capable of being managed as a unit on a
rational and timely basis." NOAA Guidance, supra note 64, at 34,458.
91. FCMA, § 304(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a) (Supp. 1977).
92. Id. § 304(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c).
93. Id. § 301(a) (1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (a) (1).
94. Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18).
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to such additional factors as the value of the resource for purposes
other than for harvesting, the importance of the quality of recrea-
tional fishing, the pertinent social and economic conditions, the need
for fishery products, and the present and future condition of the
habitat.9 The remaining national standards require that the plans be
based on the best scientific information available, provide for the
management of stocks as a unit throughout their range,97 avoid dis-
crimination between residents of different states, promote the effi-
cient utilization of resources, 9 s allow for flexibility in management,
minimize costs, and avoid unnecessary duplication. 9 Furthermore,
management plans must include the following provisions: measures
necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery, a
description of the fishery and the present fishing levels and interests
involved, a specific list of pertinent data and statistics to be submitted
to the Secretary, information concerning the present and future
MSY and OY, and a calculation of the potential harvest of fishing
vessels of the United States and the surplus available for foreign fish-
ing.100 The principal discretionary provisions in the management plans
include the various permit requirements that are applicable to all who
use the fishery, which establish seasonal and area limits and may
restrict the use of certain equipment and the size and quantity of the
catch.' 0 1 The plan also may establish a system of limiting access to
the fishery to achieve OY.10 2
Fishing by foreigners is strictly limited under the FCMA. The Act
prohibits foreign fishing within the fishery conservation zone and for
anadromous species beyond the zone unless an international fishery
agreement existed prior to passage of the Act or a governing interna-
tional fishery agreement is promulgated pursuant to the FCMA,
reciprocity exists between the foreign nation and the United States
with respect to fishing privileges, and the foreign vessel has a valid
permit to engage in such fishing.10 3 The Act limits the total amount
95. NOAA Guidance, supra note 64, at 34,458.
96. Id.
97. Standard 3 as set forth in § 301(a) (3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a) (3) (Supp.
1977), also provides that interrelated stocks of fish be managed as either a single
unit-or in close coordination.
98. Standard 5 as set forth in § 301(a) (5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a) (5), al-
though encouraging efficiency, cautions against making economic allocation the
sole purpose of a conservation measure.
99. Id. § 301(a) (2)-(7), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a) (2)-(7).
100. Id. § 303 (a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853 (a).
101. Id. § 303 (b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853 (b).
102. Id. § 303(b) (6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b) (6).
103. Id. § 201(a)-(c), (f), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)-(c), (f).
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of foreign fishing to that portion of the OY of each fishery not caught
by American ships. 1°4 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
Secretary of Commerce, allocates this amount among the various na-
tions according to their traditional fishing patterns, their past co-
operation and contribution to fishery research and enforcement, and
any other appropriate criteria.0 5 As the Secretary of State receives
applications for foreign fishing permits, he publishes them in the
Federal Register and circulates them for comment by the Secretary of
Commerce, the appropriate Councils, the Secretary of the department
in which the Coast Guard is operating, and the designated committees
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. 00 After reviewing
the comments and recommendations, the Secretary of Commerce may
approve or disapprove an application with conditions or restric-
tions.' 07
Although the Federal Fisheries Conservation Zone is defined to
exclude state territorial waters 108 and the FCMA contains a saving
clause leaving the states competent to exercise jurisdiction within
their boundaries, 0 9 the Act has a potential extraterritorial impact on
state authority which would be upheld under the preemption doc-
trine.110 The principal source of extraterritorial impact is the third
national standard for fishery conservation and management plans,
which directs that individual stocks of fish be managed as a unit
throughout their range."' Obviously, adequate management of any
stock located in both the federal and state zones of authority is im-
possible if the state enforces regulations differing substantially from
those of its Regional Council. Because the FCMA grants the Secretary
of Commerce the ultimate power over the promulgation of manage-
ment plans, ' 2 there exists a legal mechanism by which the federal
104. Id. § 201(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d).
105. Id. § 201(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e).
106. Id. § 204(b) (4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b) (4).
107. See id. § 204(b) (5)-(9), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b) (5)-(9).
108. See id. § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811.
109. Id. § 306(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a). See note 62 supra & accompanying
text.
110. Preemption would be effected under the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. This is the basis of the holding in Douglas, in which the
Court determined that Congress could conclude that the taking of fish in state
waters affects interstate commerce and invoked the commerce clause to uphold
the federal government's right to regulate that activity. 97 S. Ct. at 1750. This
analysis in Douglas would support the validity of a comprehensive federal pro-
gram instituted under the FCMA.
111. FCMA, § 301(a) (3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a) (3) (Supp. 1977); NOAA
Guidance, supra note 64, at 34,458-59. See note 97 supra & accompanying text.
112. See generally FCMA, § 304(a)-(f), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a)-(f) (Supp.
1977).
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government may compel a state to conform its management practices
with federal standards, at least with respect to stocks ranging both
inside and outside the three mile limit. This federal authority can be
enforced, if necessary, through the override provision of the FCMA,
which permits the Secretary, after he has found that a state is frus-
trating the implementation of a fishery management plan, to oversee
the regulation of the applicable fishery within the boundaries of that
state according to the provisions of the plan." 3 Furthermore, recently
adopted guidelines for the third national standard require the
Council to consider the interrelationship of species and habitat in
management plans "4 and to address the impact of pollution and the
effects of wetland and estuarine degradation upon fish units." 5 These
guidelines may provide a basis for federal involvement in wetland
regulation beyond that authority already exercised by the Corps of
Engineers under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 116
and by both the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act." 7
Despite this potential preemptive federal authority, many mechan-
isms for state involvement were included in the FCMA. The states are
represented among the Regional Council members; 118 thus the
management plans undoubtedly will reflect state interests. In fact,
the Act specifically directs that each Council reflect the "expertise
and interest" of its constituent states, within their respective ocean
areas."9 Another provision of the FCMA allows the incorporation of
state conservation and management measures into particular plans
on a discretionary basis. 20
Two additional possible state inputs into Regional Council planning
activities are noteworthy. The procedures of the National Environ-
113. Id. § 306(b) (1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(b) (1). The provision requires that
the Secretary grant notice and the opportunity for a hearing before he takes
action. The state may regain its authority over a fishery by applying to the
Secretary for a reinstatement. If the reasons for which regulation was assumed
no longer prevail, then the Secretary must approve the state's application. Id. §
306(b) (2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(b) (2).
114. NOAA Guidance, supra note 64, at 34,459.
115. Id.
116. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
117. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 404,
33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Supp. 1977).
118. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
119. FCMA, § 302(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a) (Supp. 1977).
120. Id. § 303(b) (5), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b) (5). This clause provides that a
fishery conservation and management plan, consistent with the national standards
and other applicable law, may "consider ... the relevant fishery conservation and
management measures of the coastal States nearest to the fishery." Id.
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mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)12 1 are applicable to the Regional
Councils' actions. 22 Compliance with NEPA, which requires prepara-
tion of a detailed environmental impact statement for any "major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment," 123 will be necessary prior to the promulgation of most
management plans. Through this process the states, as well as other
interested parties, will have an opportunity to comment on the fishery
management plans. 24 Moreover, the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972 125 requires that federal agency actions directly affecting the
coastal zone be consistent, to the maximum feasible extent, with the
coastal zone management programs of the states . 2 6 Thus, the Councils
will need to coordinate their actions with those of the state agencies
involved in coastal planning. 2
7
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE FISHING LAWS OF A
TYPICAL COASTAL STATE: NORTH CAROLINA
To highlight the imminent changes in state management of marine
fisheries as a result of recent developments, it is useful to focus on
the laws and regulations of a particular coastal state. Although North
Carolina has not been in the forefront of pioneering legislative devel-
opments, it has given serious attention to marine fishery regulation
for many years; 128 thus it is a good choice for such an exercise.
A. An Overview of North Carolina Fisheries Law
Marine fishing is an important industry in North Carolina. Com-
mercial landings in 1976 totaled almost $27.4 million, 2 9 and recrea-
tional fishing is a key factor in the multimillion dollar coastal tourist
industry. The major commercially-valued species of fish in North
Carolina are shrimp, blue crabs, hard clams, oysters, sea scallops,
121. NEPA, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
122. NOAA Guidance, supra note 4, at 34,453.
123. NEPA, § 102(2) (c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970).
124. Id.
125. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, §§ 301-315, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-
1464 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
126. Id. § 307(c) (1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c) (1). See also id. § 307(a), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1456(a).
127. NOAA Guidance, supra note 64, at 34,453.
128. See generally W. ANDREWS, JR., NORTH CAROLINA FISHING LAW: ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL AND SISTER STATE LAW (1975).
129. Street, Trends in North Carolina Commercial Fisheries, 12 N.C. TAR HEEL
COAST, No. 2, 3 (Aug. 1977).
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striped bass, flounder, croaker, spot, gray trout, and menhaden. 130
Authority over the marine and estuarine resources of North Caro-
lina is vested in a Marine Fisheries Commission whose fifteen mem-
bers are appointed by the Governor. 13' The Commission is responsible
for establishing policy and promulgating rules and regulations. A
Commercial and Sports Fisheries Advisory Committee makes recom-
mendations on fisheries policy to the Secretary of Natural and
Economic Resources. 32
Geographically, North Carolina law asserts jurisdiction over a zone
extending 200 miles from the coastline, 33 but as a practical matter,
the state has never attempted to regulate the area beyond the three
mile limit. 3 4 This extensive claim of jurisdiction, probably invalid
when enacted, now is preempted by the FCMA. As do most coastal
states, North Carolina has exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction
through the enforcement of several landing laws prohibiting posses-
sion within North Carolina territory of any fish in violation of the
size and seasonal limitations.135
Presently, North Carolina regards its marine fisheries as a com-
mon property resource 136 and grants open access to all fishery users.
130. Id.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. 143B-287 (1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., C. 512, Pamphlet
No. 9). To ensure representation of particular interests, this provision directs the
Governor to select one person actively connected with and having experience in
each of the following fields: commercial fishing, wildlife or sport fishing, marine
ecology, coastal land development, and seafood processing and distribution. The
Governor also appoints ten at-large members, seven of whom must be coastal
area residents.
132. Id. § 143B-325.1 (1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., C. 512, Pamphlet No. 9).
The primary duties of this committee are: to study all matters and activities con-
nected with the conservation of marine and estuarine resources and make recom-
mendations to the Secretary of Natural and Economic Resources; to act as a
liaison group between sports and commercial fishermen and other groups con-
cerned with the "beneficial utilization" of the state's marine and estuarine re-
sources; to consider and advise the Secretary on certain matters which he refers
to it; and to originate its own studies on various matters within its scope of
interest. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-325 (Supp. 3C 1975). The committee is com-
posed of three sports fishermen, three commercial fishermen, and three profes-
sional scientists who have backgrounds relevant to the conservation of marine and
estuarine resources. These members are selected by the Governor. Id. § 143B-326.
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-134.1 (1975).
134. Interview with Edward G. McCoy, Director of the North Carolina Division
of Marine Fisheries, in Morehead City, North Carolina (Aug. 11, 1977) [here-
inafter cited as McCoy Interview].
135. N.C. FISHING REG. FOR COASTAL WATERS §§ .1104, .1201 (1977) (calico
scallops, lobster).
136. By statute, the marine and estuarine resources "belong to the people of the
State as a whole." The Department of Natural and Economic Resources and the
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The state has not employed the concept of limited entry,13 which has
been used in a few states for economic and conservation purposes."'
The Marine Fisheries Commission has broad discretion in promulgat-
ing appropriate measures to manage the fishery resources. 39 Com-
monly, the regulations imposed on fishermen using the principal state
fisheries establish gear restrictions, area and seasonal limits, methods
of taking, and fish size and amount limitations.
Additional regulation of the fisheries in North Carolina is achieved
through various license, permit, and lease requirements for certain
categories of users of the resource. Licenses must be purchased in a
Wildlife Resources Commission are accountable for these resources. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-131 (1975).
137. Limited entry restricts access to the fishery resource to maximize the
catch in relation to the fishing effort employed. This is accomplished by integrat-
ing economic data with biological data, thereby developing programs that prevent
depletion and waste. In seeking to utilize efficiently both the natural and indus-
trial resources, the limited entry system differs from traditional fishery manage-
ment, which attempts to maintain the maximum sustainable yield. See note 138
infra.
138. Alaska and Washington have the most comprehensive state limited entry
systems. The purpose of a limited entry system, as set forth by the Alaska legis-
lature, is "to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of
Alaska's fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial
fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the common fisheries
in the public interest and without unjust discrimination." ALASKA STAT.
§ 16.43.010 (1973). In Alaska, a state commission determines the maximum
number of entry permits available and allocates them among fishermen on the
bases of economic dependency and past participation in the fishery. The permits
are freely transferable and may be purchased by the commission to reduce
participation to an optimal level. Id. §§ 16.43.010-.380. Limited entry licensing
provisions are in effect for the herring and salmon fisheries in Washington. To
obtain a herring permit, individuals must prove that they have held a prior com-
mercial fishing license and actually caught herring during the years 1971-73, as
documented by a landing ticket. If the number of permits must be reduced, those
vessels with the shortest history of landings are eliminated. Entry permits for
ships in the salmon fishery are limited to those vessels that previously have held
gear and area licenses and actually caught salmon during the years 1970-74.
The licenses are transferable, and provisions exist to relieve economic hardship
under certain circumstances. These provisions are directed specifically towards
the charter industry. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 75.28.390-.485 (Supp. 1977).
California, 14 CAL. FISH AND GAME COMM'N REG. § 163 (1974), Michigan, MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 308.1(b) (1977), and Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.342 (Supp.
1977), also have delegated authority to their fishery departments to establish
limited entry programs.
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-286 (1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., C. 512,
Pamphlet No. 9). State management controls have been described as inadequate
to protect fisheries resources. See NORTH CAROLINA MARINE SCIENCE COUNCILS,
NORTH CAROLINA'S COASTAL RESOURCES 6-17 to 6-21 (Dec. 15, 1972).
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number of circumstances. First, vessels engaged in commercial fish-
ing, which is defined in terms of using commercial fishing equipment
or fishing for the purpose of selling the catch, are required to obtain a
commercial fishing license. 140 This license requirement applies to ships
engaging in commericial fishing outside the state's waters when the
primary situs of those vessels is in North Carolina. 14 1 Although one
of the primary purposes of licensing is to generate revenue, the fees
for residents are nominal, ranging from $1.00 for boats without
motors to seventy-five cents per foot for vessels over twenty-six feet
in length. 142 Nonresidents of North Carolina, however, must pay $200
for each ship licensed, regardless of its length. 43 Significantly, rec-
reational and sports fishermen who do not use commercial gear are
free from any licensing requirements. 4 4
Second, all persons taking oysters or clams from state waters for
commercial purposes also must obtain a license.1 45 This license costs
$1.00 and is restricted to state residents. 46 Third, persons who market
fish commercially, with the exception of commercial fishermen, must
purchase a fish dealer's license. 47 The primary purpose of this license
is to facilitate the collection of North Carolina's tax on fish sales and
to gather sale statistics. 148 Apparently, there is widespread evasion of
this tax, which currently generates only $28,000 per year; as a result,
fish sale statistics generally are unreliable. 49 Fourth, all commercial
fishermen who land in the state for the purpose of selling fish are
required to obtain a license. 50
Various kinds of gear, such as butterfly nets used for taking shrimp
and hydraulic dredges used for collecting hard clams, may be operated
validly only with a permit.151 Moreover, the Marine Fisheries Com-
mission requires a permit for the dredging or filling of wetland
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-152(a) (1) (1975).
141. Id. § 113-152(a) (2).
142. See id. § 113-152(c) (1)-(4).
143. Id. § 113-152(c) (5) (1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., C. 999, Pamphlet No.
11, Part II). According to Mr. McCoy, this provision primarily is an attempt to
discourage South Carolina vessels from fishing in North Carolina's waters. Vir-
ginia residents routinely are denied licenses on the ground that Virginia dis-
criminates similarly against North Carolina fishermen. McCoy Interview, supra
note 134.
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-151 to -156 (1975).
145. Id. § 113-154(a).
146. Id. § 113-154(c).
147. Id. § 113-156.
148. McCoy Interview, supra note 134.
149. Id.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-155 (1975).
151. N.C. FISHING REG. FOR COASTAL WATERS §§ .0202-03 (1977).
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areas.152 Finally, to promote the commercial cultivation of oysters and
clams, the Commission leases to state residents portions of the public
seabeds underlying the coastal fishing waters that do not already con-
tain natural oyster or clam beds. 153
B. The Potential Impact of Federal Fisheries Management on North
Carolina Law
Using present North Carolina fishery law as an illustration, one
may predict some of the changes in state marine fishery management
that are likely to result from the recently intensified federal involve-
ment. The impact of the FCMA on the states is not totally in the
negative direction of erosion of state power; in fact, the federal
program presents the states with new opportunities that, if taken,
will lead to an increased state role and enormous economic and social
benefits for a state's fishing and coastal communities.
Probably the major impact of the FCMA upon North Carolina's
fishery management will be a sharp curtailment of the freedom of
action enjoyed by the Marine Fisheries Commission, which tradi-
tionally has exercised virtually unlimited discretion in substantive
management matters. Except with respect to fisheries that are wholly
within state waters, the Commission, under the threat of federal
override, 54 will be compelled to follow the lead of the Regional Coun-
cils when promulgating its management regulations. Because the full-
time staff of each Regional Council will be extremely limited, 55 the
major new influence in state management policy will be the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Department of Commerce.
This agency has a superior data collection capability and possesses
more information concerning the biological and ecological factors of
fishery resources than does any individual state agency.156
In addition to coordinating seasonal, equipment, and other manage-
ment restrictions with the Council's plan, the state may be required
to change the quality of its fishery program. NMFS and other federal
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229 to -230 (1975).
153. Id. § 113-202(a) (1975).
154. See notes 112-13 supra & accompanying text.
155. See NOAA Guidance, supra, note 64, at 34,454. Each Council shall have a
minimum administrative staff consisting of an executive director, an adminis-
trative officer, and a secretary. The number of additional staff will vary accord-
ing to the workload and available resources but is not to exceed seven employees.
Id.
156. Interview with Ted Rice, Regional Director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service, in Morehead City, North Carolina (July 19, 1977) [herein-
after cited as Rice Interview].
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authorities probably will encourage the comprehensive management
of each fishery and may promote the adoption of limited entry pro-
grams, which would curtail access to fisheries by restricting the
availability of licenses, establishing quotas, and imposing high entry
fees to discourage all but the most economically efficient opera-
tions.157 Although the concept of limited entry raises many contro-
versial political, economic, and constitutional issues,158 the Councils
possess the discretionary power under the FCMA to adopt such a
management program, and as the need to conserve fishing resources
increases, the elements of the limited entry management alternative
undoubtedly will receive increasing attention.
157. H. KNIGHT & J. LAMBERT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIMITED ENTRY FOR COM-
MERCIAL MARINE FISHERIES 3 (N.M.F.S. & La. St. U., Negotiated Research Con-
tract No. 03-4-042-2, Oct. 15, 1975). For additional discussion of limited entry
programs see notes 137-38 supra.
158. For a discussion of the economics and constitutional issues of limited
entry management see H. KNIGHT & J. LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 9; Groseclose
& Boone,-An Examination of Limited Entry as a Method of Allocating Com-
mercial Fishing Rights, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 201 (1977); Note, Legal Di-
mensions of Entry Fishery Management, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 757 (1976).
See also Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alas. 1976), in which the court held
that a provision restricting applications for entry permits to fishermen who had
gear licenses before a specific cut-off date did not have a fair and substantial
relation to the purpose of the Alaska limited entry act. The purpose of the cut-off
date was to terminate a rush to buy gear. This contradicted the purpose of the
limited entry law, which was to allow access to the fishery based on a number of
factors other than past participation. The decision merely overturned the cut-off
date; the limited entry management system survived. The constitutionality of a
limited entry system under North Carolina law has been questioned. See H.
KNIGHT & T. JACKSON, LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE USE OF INTERSTATE AGREE-
MENTS IN COORDINATED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS: STATES IN THE
N.M.F.S. SOUTHEAST REGION 73-74 (N.M.F.S. & La. St. U., Contract No. 03-3-
042-28, Sept. 28, 1973). Knight and Jackson rely on In Re Certificate of Need for
Ashton Park Hospital, Inc., 282 N.C. 543, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973), in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a statute requiring a certificate of
need for the construction of a hospital constituted a deprivation of liberty with-
out -due process of law and violated the equal protection clause of the North Caro-
lina Constitution. Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735. Quoting from Roller v. Allen, 245
N.C. 516, 518, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1957), the court stated: "The right to work and
to earn a livelihood is a property right that cannot be taken away except under the
police power of the State in the paramount public interest for reasons of health,
safety, morals, or public welfare.'" 282 N.C. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 735. Because a
reasonable relation did not exist between the denial of the right to work and the
promotion of public health, the court held the statute invalid. Id. This reasoning
probably would not apply to invalidate a limited entry system in North Carolina,
however, if the entry permits can be transferred freely and therefore preclude
no one from working.
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Even if a limited entry system is not implemented, North Carolina
must employ a more comprehensive system of regulation. Because no
license requirement exists for recreational and sports fishermen, little
data has been collected concerning the number of such fishermen or
the species and amount of their catches. 159 This lack of information
prevents a fair allocation of the fishery resource between recreational
fishermen and other user groups, and as a result, conflict has been
increasing between sport and commercial fishermen. 160 Also, the
federal authorities may compel North Carolina to integrate the regu-
lation of its marshland and wetland resources 161 with its fisheries
management program and to establish a more adequate plan for con-
trolling coastal pollution. 6 2
A more serious problem with North Carolina's fishery management
system, however, is its discrimination against nonresidents. Twenty-
nine years after the Supreme Court's decision in Toomer v. Witsell163
North Carolina still maintains a system of discriminatory licensing
procedures similar to the practices invalidated in Toomer.'64 This
discrimination demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the various multi-
state marine fisheries commissions 165 created by interstate compact
159. McCoy Interview, supra note 134; Rice Interview, supra note 156.
160. McCoy Interview, supra note 134. Another source of conflict between
sports and commercial fishermen in North Carolina are the nominal fees charged
for commercial fishing licenses, which encourage sportsmen to purchase com-
mercial fishing licenses and to use commercial fishing gear, even though they
may use the fishery only a few times a season. Id. One solution to this problem
is to increase the cost of commercial fishing licenses so that only efficient producers
will be able to use commercial gear to exploit the fishery.
161. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra. North Carolina regulates the
dredging and filling of marshlands, wetlands, and navigable waters. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 113-229 to -230 (1975). Additionally, under the state's coastal zone
management program, wetlands and marshlands are "areas of environmental
concerns," id. § 113A-113 (1975), and development within them is subject to a
state permit. Id. § 113A-118 (1975).
162. More than one-third of North Carolina's estuarine and coastal waters are
closed to commercial shellfishing because of pollution, and the number of closings
is increasing. McCoy Interview, supra note 134.
163. 334 U.S. 345 (1947).
164. Compare text accompanying notes 66-69 supra with notes 142-43, 145-46
supra & accompanying text. The Supreme Court noted in Douglas that many
states enforce discriminatory fishing laws; it cited Maryland, Massachusetts, and
New York as examples. 97 S. Ct. at 1752.
165. Several commissions created by interstate compact among particular
regional groups of states have been approved by Congress. These include: the
Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission, ch. 66, 63 Stat. 70 (1949) ; the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission, ch. 283, 56 Stat. 267 (1942), as amended,
ch. 763, 64 Stat. 467 (1950); and the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission, ch.
316, 61 Stat. 419 (1947). North Carolina is a member of the Atlantic States
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to secure the enactment of uniform fishery laws.166
Under the Supreme Court's standards, North Carolina's discrimi-
natory practices are unconstitutional. According to Douglas, the state
cannot deny vessels documented under the enrollment and licensing
laws the right to use its fisheries. Moreover, under the broader stand-
ard of Toomer, the blanket denial of commercial fishing licenses to
Virginians and the discriminatory license fee charged to South Caro-
linians violate the privileges and immunities clause unless such prac-
tices can be justified by a substantial state interest other than the fact
that those who are the objects of the discrimination are residents of
another state. 61 Thus even discrimination against non-documented
vessels can be proscribed under the Supreme Court's holding in
Toomer. Furthermore, the provision in North Carolina's law limiting
commercial clam and oyster licenses to residents can apply validly
to inland waters only under the doctrine in McCready v. Virginia,6 8
as modified by the Court in Toomer.'69 Finally, the fourth national
standard under the FCMA,17 0 which prohibits discrimination between
residents of different states, provides an additional legal basis to over-
turn North Carolina's discriminatory practices. Thus the new federal
standards will force North Carolina's fishermen to share the state's
Marine Fisheries Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-252 (1975).
166. The purpose of the compacts is to promote a more desirable utilization of
fisheries through the development of a joint program that prevents waste and
protects the resource. The commissions may make recommendations to the mem-
ber states to coordinate fishery regulation, but they have no direct management
authority. Because the compacts are only agreements to consult, they have been
ineffective in providing a framework for coordiration and uniformity among
state fishery management programs. H. KNIGHT & T. JACKSON, supra note 158, at
63. The Supreme Court in Toomer recognized that the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission's duties were mainly advisory and therefore had little
effect on the South Atlantic shrimp fishery. 334 U.S. at 388 n.5.
167. 334 U.S. at 396-97. See note 68 supra & accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of North Carolina's discriminatory enforcement of its commercial licensing
laws among residents of different states see note 143 supra.
168. 94 U.S. at 391 (1876).
169. 334 U.S. at 401. For a discussion of McCready, as limited by Toomer, see
note 68 supra.
170. FCMA, § 301(a) (4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (a) (4) (Supp. 1977). This sec-
tion provides:
Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate
between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to
allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States
fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all
such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conserva-
tion; and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular




fishery with nonresidents, but the new requirements also will grant
North Carolina residents access to the resources of other states.
The most beneficial result of federal fishery management upon
the states will be an opening of new frontiers for their marine fishery
management programs. The provision under the FCMA restricting
foreign fishing within the 200 mile limit to that portion of the OY in
excess of domestic fishing capability 171 is an invitation to the states
to encourage their fishermen's utilization of the resource- Further-
more, the determination of QY and the other national standards for
fishery management plans prepared by the Regional Councils rests
upon the application of biological, statistical, sociological, and eco-
nomic knowledge and information; 172 therefore, the effectiveness of
a state's attempts to influence Council decisions will be limited only
by its ability to gather and inject such data into the decision-making
process.
Presently, most states' programs are deficient in their ability to in-
crease domestic capability and gather informational data. Although
North Carolina operates a fishermen's economic development program
that provides advisory services to fishermen,'7 3 the state has not given
the program sufficient priority. For example, the state's marketing
and fish processing facilities never have been able to accommodate
the entire commercial catch; consequently, some fish caught by the
state's fishermen must be shipped elsewhere for processing and dis-
tribution. 1'7 4 To improve the capability of its fishermen a state must
increase its financial assistance, its technical advisory services, and
its marketing and business education programs for fishermen. In
short, states must establish a comprehensive framework promoting
the development of their commercial fishing industries.
Similarly, a widespread lack of knowledge concerning data pertinent
to the states's fisheries exists among the states. For example, catch
statistics are largely incomplete.'7 5 In addition, fish sales are reported
171. Id. §§ 201(d), 303 (a) (4), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821(d), 1853 (a) (4).
172. See notes 94-99 supra & accompanying text; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, ESTABLISHING A 200-MILE FISHERIES ZONE 88-92 (1977).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113.-315.18 (1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., C. 356,
Pamphlet No. 7). The Secretary of Natural and Economic Resources is authorized
to provide services to promote the economic development of fishermen. These
include: a business management service o promote better business management
practices and techniques and better use of credit; counseling services to -assist
fishermen in meeting federal and State environmental, safety, and health require-
ments; and an improved water transportation system to accommodate commercial
and sport fishing craft safely and efficiently and to provide access to and
from fishing grounds. Id.
174. NORTH CAROLINA MARINE SCIENCE COUNCILS, supra note 139, at 6-22.
175. Rice Interview, supra note 156.
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only in connection with tax payments and thus are unreliable. 176 Very
little biological information exists with respect to the relationship be-
tween fish stocks and changing environmental conditions.177 Sociologi-
cal data concerning the coastal communities is almost nonexistent.1 8
This knowledge is a necessary component of an effective state manage-
ment program, and serious efforts to obtain it must be a part of future
plans. The federal government's entry into the field of fishery
management may provide the new legal authority and financial re-
sources that are necessary for a comprehensive study and resolution
of these problems.
CONCLUSION
The Fishery Management Conservation Act of 1976 and the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Dotglas v. Seacoast Prod-
ucts, Inc. present the states with both new problems and opportunities
in the operation of their marine fishery management program. These
developments on the federal level will compel revolutionary changes
in state fishery management. Because of increased federal involve-
ment, the states must limit severely the freedom of action previously
enjoyed by state authorities in this field and upgrade the quality of
their present management plans to conform with the plans of their
respective Regional Councils. In addition, the recent federal activity
reaffirms the judicial pronouncement that the states may not validly
attempt to reserve their fisheries exclusively for the benefit of their
own citizens. In contrast with these limitations upon state activity,
however, the new fisheries management concepts provide the states
with an unprecedented opportunity to develop their own fishing indus-
tries. To take maximum advantage of these benefits the states should
not hesitate to revise comprehensively their laws and programs relat-
ing to the management of marine fisheries.
176. See notes 148-49 supra & accompanying text.
177. McCoy Interview, supra note 134; Rice Interview, supra note 156.
178. Rice Interview, supra note 156; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 172.
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